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Will Hong Kong Be Successfully
Integrated into China? A Human
Rights Perspective
YuPingABs&RAC"
This Article explores the human rightsforecastfollowing
Hong Kong's reintegration into China. The Article first
reviews the British human rights record in Hong Kong, and
explains why China was angered by last-ditchBritishpolitical
reform. It then explores the legalframework of Hong Kong,
including the Sino-BritishJointDeclarationand the Basic Law
of Hong Kong, and concludes that neither offers significant
protection for human rights in Hong Kong. In particular,
Chinese state security and state secrets laws are likely to be
used to
suppress political dissidents, journalists,
internationalorganizations, and other "foreign elements" in

Hong Kong. The Article next examines internationalhuman
rights law and concludes that such law is an equally weak
mechanismfor protecting human rights in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong's reintegration into China is likely to bring short-term
erosion of human rights in Hong Kong. That reintegration
may influence China itself in positive ways, however, as
Hong Kong serves as a human rightsfocal point and as a link
toward China'sfurther modernization.

* Ph.D. candidate, University of Washington Law School. Legal consultant
and member of the executive committee of Human Rights in China (HRIC). The
author would like to thank the Editorial Board of the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw for its every effort on this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

With the return of Hong Kong to China, there is much
speculation about Hong Kong's future.
China, through its
negotiations with the United Kingdom (hereinafter U.K.), promised
that Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy after its
reversion to China. All social systems and political structure
would basically remain unchanged, and lifestyle and economic
prosperity would be preserved as well, according to the Joint
Declaration of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter P.R.C.)
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain.'
Many fear, however, that when Hong Kong changes hands,
the basic rights of the Hong Kong people will be adversely
affected. The P.RC. declared several years ago that it would
encroach upon the legislature put in place by the first-ever
political reform initiated by Christopher Patten, the last English
governor.2 The National People's Congress (hereinafter NPC)
1.

See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic
of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., 23 I.L.M.
1366, 1371 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
2.
Christopher Patten launched the political reform in 1992 shortly after
he came to office. His plan to expand the electoral base for the Legislative
Council was severely attacked by China.
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announced in March 1997 that the legislature would cease to
operate after June 30, 1997. 3 Its replacement, the Provisional
Legislature, essentially hand-picked by the government of the
P.R.C., would take the place of the Legislative Council (hereinafter
Meanwhile, Tung Chee-hwa, the first
LegCo) thereafter. 4
executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

(hereinafter Hong Kong SAR), publicized his plan to roll back

social ordinances, 5 which had been amended by the British
government and which themselves had obviously been in conflict
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter ICCPR), 6 to which Hong Kong is a party by way of the
U.K.
All these incidents indicate that the promise of "one country,
two systems" by the P.R.C. is on the verge of being scrapped and
that the basic rights of Hong Kong people are in real danger.
Some may argue that the P.R.C. has many reasons to maintain
the status quo in Hong Kong. Among such reasons, the most
obvious is that China needs Hong Kong in its economic
construction. For years Hong Kong, as an international finance
center and free port, has channeled tremendous investment into
China's market, which eventually energized the P.R.C.'s national
economy. During most of the cold war period, Hong Kong provided
the only conduit for China to communicate with the rest of the
world. Even today, Hong Kong remains one of China's largest
trade partners. Indeed, China needs Hong Kong more than Hong
Kong needs China, given that China continues opening to the
world.
On the other hand, China's expectations about Hong Kong
encompass more than economic need. In the words of Chinese
leaders, recovering Hong Kong would primarily mean two things
7
to China: sovereignty and economic prosperity. Resumption of
sovereignty over Hong Kong could well serve the needs of China
according to the leadership of the country. After the completion
of the handover, nationalism will certainly increase and boost the
confidence of the communist party in ruling China. During the

3.

See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1.

The Legislative Council was ousted after the handover, while the
4.
Provisional Legislature was swom in at midnight on June 30, 1997, after the
handover ceremony.
The Provisional Legislative Council passed the resolution to roll back several
5.
ordinances including the Societies Ordinance on June 14, 1997. See Hong Kong Sing Tao
Jih Pao,(visitedJune 15, 1997) <http://vwv.singtao.com/spec2/law68.htl>.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
6.
signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

See Qian Qichen, Speech Delivered at the Closing Ceremony of the
7.
Second Plenary Session of the Preliminary Working Committee (Dec. 11, 1993) in
29 CHmNEE L. AND GoVT 940 (1993).
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past two decades, the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter CCP)
has constantly lost its faith and legitimacy as the only ruling
party in China amid introduction of economic reforms initiated by
Deng Xiaoping.
In this sense, Hong Kong's return to the
motherland will mean more to the Communist party than to
China itself, especially as Deng Xiaoping and his revolutionary
generation lose power and a new generation of leaders emerges.
Surely, Hong Kong's continuing prosperity can provide China with
a long-lasting chance to readjust itself to superpower status in
the next century.
This Article reviews the history of British rule in Hong Kong
with respect to human rights, and explains why China is angered

by last-ditch British political reform in Hong Kong.

Then, It

assesses the legal framework of future Hong Kong, including the
Joint Declaration of China and Britain and the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China (hereinafter Basic Law), to determine to what extent this
legal regime can protect people's basic rights in Hong Kong.
Space is allocated to examining the mechanism of the
international human rights system and its relevance in light of
human rights protection in Hong Kong. Finally, the Article
concludes that the devices intended to protect basic rights in
Hong Kong are inherently deficient if the designers expect to
achieve their goals. The consistent and close attention of the
world will be critical to human rights protection in Hong Kong as
well as to hold China to her promise. Whenever Hong Kong is not
the focus of the world's attention, human rights could be eroded.
On the other hand, helping China smoothly reintegrate into the
world would be a promising way to minimize the danger to Hong
Kong's human rights and prosperity. Therefore, it would be
worthwhile to try in every possible way to reintegrate China into
the international community before Hong Kong is fully integrated
into China.
I. A HISTORICAL REvIEW OF THE PROTECION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HONG KONG AND CHINA

To understand Hong Kong's current situation, one must

recall the early days of Hong Kong in relation to democracy and
human rights. Hong Kong has been best known as a paradise for
doing business. 8 The British government held overwhelming
8.

As Professor Peter Wesley-Smith put it: "Hong Kong as a British colony

was established and maintained as a trading post, and thus what was good for
commerce, including if necessary the diminution or suppression of civil liberties,
was regarded as good for Hong Kong." Peter Wesley-Smith, The Method of
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control of local politics.
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Political participation of local Chinese

was immaterial until the late 1980s. 9 In Hong Kong's three most
important branches of government, almost all top positions
historically were occupied by non-Chinese, primarily English.
Even after the Second World War, when decolonization became a
trend under the United Nations sponsorship, the U.K. generally
showed no such inclination in considering the status of Hong
Kong. l0 Worried about its rule in Hong Kong, Britain was among
a handful of the Western countries to recognize the P.R.C. during
early 1950s. For the last several decades, Britain administered
Hong Kong heavy-handedly in the areas of human rights
protection and political participation. As some observers noted,
social stability had been the top priority of British colonial
government. 11 It was not until the late 1980s, especially after the
Tiananmen Massacre, that Britain began thinking seriously of
real political reform and human right safeguards.
Under the authority of the British government, Hong Kong for
many years did not share the human rights protections bestowed
upon the people of the U.K. It can even be said that the British
government had a bad reputation insofar as human rights for the
Hong Kong people were concerned. 12 In this respect, Hong Kong
was treated even more badly than other British colonies.' 3
Although Hong Kong incidentally benefited from the U.K.'s
ratification of the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights in 1976, the
people of Hong Kong have long been barred from many rights
14
embodied both in the British laws and in these two covenants.

It was the self-restraint of the Hong Kong government in
exercising authority that preserved liberties in Hong Kong,
because the legal provisions were weak in terms of protecting
basic rights there. 15 Only recently did the British government
begin introducing a number of provisions guaranteeing the basic
Protecting Civil Liberties in Hong Kong, in CIVIL LiBERrIES IN HONG KONG 11, 11
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1988).
See LI CHANGDAO & GONG XIAOHANG, JIBENFATOUSHI (PERSPECTIVE OF THE
9.
BASIC LAw) 6-15, 29 (1990).

10.
Britain has gradually decolonized its overseas dependent territories
since 1950, but Hong Kong was an exception in this sense for a long time. Hong
Kong was the sixty-eighth colony handed over by Britain.
See Nihal Jayawickrama, Hong Kong and the InternationalProtectionof
11.
HumanRights, in CMIL IBERIES INHONG KONG. supranote 8, at 31.
See Nihal Jayawickrama, The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A Critique, in
12.
THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 55-57 (C. Johannes
Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).

Id.
Id.
See Perry Keller, Freedomof the Press in Hong Kong: Liberal Values and
Sovereign Interests,27 TEx. INT'L L. J. 371, 377-82 (1992).
13.
14.
15.
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rights of the Hong Kong people, apparently out of pressure by the
international community and the people of Hong Kong.' 6 As the
U.K. launched its last-ditch democratic reform in Hong Kong, it is
not surprising that the P.R.C. cast deep doubts on the real
intention of Britain. As one of China's top policy-makers put it:
"After entering the second half of the transition period,
particularly in recent years, disturbances agitated in Hong Kong
illustrate that Britain still intends to seek for a right to govern
over Hong Kong after 1997." 17 He continued to suspect all
political reforms introduced by the British side during the early
1990s. 18 Not coincidentally, pro-China scholars also expressed

their disbelief about the motivation of such political reform. 19
Some scholars categorized the ongoing political reform in Hong
Kong as a smoking gun to cover the real intention of the British
government in trying to keep a strong influence on Hong Kong in
the post-1997 era.
Moreover, Britain has consistently prevented its immigration
laws, which had been applied to most of its other colonies, from
applying in Hong Kong. 20 Britain also specifically excluded Hong
Kong from the obligations that it had assumed toward the people
21
of its colonies under the European human rights convention.
Therefore, unlike citizens of most other British colonies, the
22
people of Hong Kong never enjoyed the right to live in the U.K.
Even after the Tiananmen massacre, only a small portion of
people in Hong Kong had conditional rights to immigrate
to the
U.K., and they came under a specially designed plan. 23
British complacency toward human rights in Hong Kong also
includes failures in implementing the two U.N.-sponsored human
rights covenants. As discussed below, although Britain assumed
its responsibilities under the two covenants for Hong Kong, she
has made little effort to bring the system of Hong Kong into line
with the terms set out in the covenants. The Human Rights
16.
See CHRISTOPHER PATrEN, OuR NEXT FivE YEARs: THE AGENDA FOR HONG
KONG 30-43 (1993).

17.
18.

Qichen, supranote 7.
IdL

19.
See CHANGDAO & XIAOHANG, supranote 9, at 26.
20.
Id. See also Mark F. McElreath, "Degrading Treatment"-from East
Africa to Hong Kong: British Violations of Human Rights, 22 COLuM. HUM. Rrs. L,
REV. 331, 336-41 (1991).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.

23.
To calm the panic caused by the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and
comfort the civil servants of Hong Kong, in 1990 Britain carved out a complicated
plan that allowed certain people who had contributed to Hong Kong In the past,
or who held important positions In the government, to immigrate to the U.K. The
beneficiaries roughly amount to 225,000, which Is only 3.7% of the six million
Hong Kong people.
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Committee (hereinafter HRC) and the committee set up under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Culture Rights

expressed their dissatisfactions with the performance of the

British government in implementing the covenants in Hong Kong,
especially with regard to Hong Kong's political structure, which is
basically premised on privileges rather than on rights.
occasion, the Committee pointed out:

On one

[The] electoral system in Hong Kong does not meet the requirement
of article 25, as well as articles 2, 3, and 26 of the Covenant. It
underscores in particular that only 20 of 60 seats in the Legislative
Council are subject to direct popular election and that the concept
of functional constituencies, which gives undue weight to the views
of the business community, discriminates among voters on the
24
basis of property and functions.

Due to the long-time reluctance of Britain to reform Hong Kong's
system, the human rights situation in Hong Kong has been rather
dissatisfactory.
As the handover drew near, the British
government had left crucial issues unsettled. The Hong Kong
people still did not enjoy the right of universal suffrage. 25 Even

under Patten's reform plan, only half of the legislators were
elected. 2 6 Legally speaking, the Hong Kong people did not fully
enjoy freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. 2 7 Although
the vast majority of the Hong Kong population are ethnically
Chinese, Chinese was never considered an official language in the
history of Hong Kong. 2 8 Although the Bill of Rights promulgated
in 1991 made crucial amendments to such suppressive
ordinances as the Societies Ordinance and Defamation
Ordinance, the amendments were barely sufficient to bring the
ordinances in line with the ICCPR and other international human

24.
U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.57 (1995).
25.
Under the current electoral system, only half of the legislative positions
are elected, and most of administrative positions, including the governor (the
future chief executive of Hong Kong SAR) are appointed. See PATrEN, supra note
16, at 30-43.
26.
Id.
27.
There are some regulations that were amended in the last minutes
before Britain left this prosperous colony. In the past decades, the law restrained
or even prohibited people from simply expressing their opinions in certain areas.
It was common understanding that the law was implemented in a very cautious
way, which largely depended on the self-restrains of the colonial government.
However, this did not relieve the responsibilities of the British government in
terms of the poor human rights record in Hong Kong.
28.
The Human Rights Committee, in its 1451st and 1453rd meetings,
held on October 19 and 20, 1995, expressed its concern with the language
problem, and specifically requested that Hong Kong government "introduce, as
soon as possible, Chinese version of official charge forms and charge sheets as
well as court documents." See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.57, supranote 24.
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Ironically, as a China observer predicted

some years ago, the first Hong Kong bill of rights was contained in

the Basic Law of Hong Kong (1990), enacted by the P.R.C. The
British could have freely made such a human rights law many
29
years ago.
Some reformative steps initiated by the last govemor
Christopher Patten did bring hope for human rights protection in
Hong Kong. Unfortunately, such a limited reform will be cause
for pointless political conflicts between China and the U.K.
Considering its long historical stand and poor performance in
Hong Kong, the U.K. can never shun its responsibilities for the
shabby safeguard of human rights in Hong Kong.
The suspicion of the P.R.C. that the last-ditch reform by
Christopher Patten was a British strategy for a glorious retreat Is
somewhat understandable considering Britain's historical
performance in the colonies. 30 Although China obviously lacks
sincerity and interest in protecting the human rights of the Hong
Kong people, the conflicts between the governments of Britain and
China over the political reform can be attributed, at least
partially, to the historical position of Britain. By the account of
the P.R.C., the British government initially tried to retain
administrative authority in the early stages of negotiations on the
return of Hong Kong. Only after the vehement opposition of
China did Britain relent.3 1
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM ON HONG KONG
AFrER HANDOVER

The promise of "one country, two systems" and of Hong Kong
leadership in Hong Kong is premised on certain foundations,
which are inherently deficient in terms of maintaining the status
quo and safeguarding human rights in Hong Kong. Several key
unsettled issues cast an ominous shadow on the future of Hong
Kong, particularly with regard to human rights protections and
democracy.

29.
30.

SeeJayawickrama, supranote 12, at 64.
See CHANGDAO &XIAOHANG, supra note 9.

31.

In the television serials. Hong Kong's Suffering Experience (Xang Gang

Cang Sang) run throughout China on the eve of Hong Kong's return, It was
revealed that British prime minister Thatcher, in negotiating with China,
instructed her delegation to request the continuation of British administration of
Hong Kong after 1997. In exchange, China would recover a symbolic sovereignty
of Hong Kong. It had been reported that Deng Xiaoping resolutely denied any
such solution. See Qichen, supranote 7, at 93.
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A. ConstitutionalChallengesHong Kong Will FacePost-1997
As many scholars have noted, Hong Kong will be governed
primarily by a three-tier system of laws: (1) the constitutional
level of law, which includes the Joint Declaration and the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China; (2) the Basic Law
of Hong Kong, a mini-constitution for Hong Kong; and (3)
remaining legislation and common law rules.
Because the "one country, two systems" policy, carved out by
Deng Xiaoping, is guaranteed by the Basic Law and other
legislation passed by the NPC, it becomes pivotal that adequate
legal recourse in implementing these policies and laws is
provided. If Hong Kong's future government comes into conflict
with the Chinese central government, a reasonable solution must
be available to resolve the conflict.
The Joint Declaration signed by Britain and China is
regarded as a treaty-type legal document. Its legal status has
been strongly asserted by the British side. Britain has warned
China that it will seek an international recourse should China
break any terms of the Joint Declaration.
China, however,
seemed to ignore such warnings during altercations with Britain
throughout the final stage of the transition, and claimed that
anything happening in Hong Kong after the handover would be
strictly regarded as an internal affair of the P.R.C. and have
nothing to do with Britain. 3 2 No matter how strongly the legal
effects of the Joint Declaration might be interpreted under
international law, the international legal process will not likely be
the means of solving potential disputes in relation to Hong Kong
in the future. 3 3 It is also not the best way for London to hold
Beijing to its promises in the Joint Declaration, especially since
the terms enshrined in the Joint Declaration are somewhat
ambivalent and not executable in terms of safeguarding Hong
3 4
Kong from interference from the central government.

On the other hand, the only article in the 1982 Constitution
of the P.R.C. remotely relating to Hong Kong is Article 31, which
authorizes the central government to establish a special

32.

Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu declared that China would

not allow any outside interference with Hong Kong's affairs after the 1997
handover. China Protests Signing of U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Bill, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), Oct. 15, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, BNA1TD File.
33.

See Paul Vitrano, Note, Hong Kong 1997: Can the People's Republic of

ChinaBe Compelled to Abide by the Joint Declaration?,28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 445, 457-61 (1995).

34.
For example, the Joint Declaration does not mention a mechanism to
enforce the terms contained In the Joint Declaration. See Joint Declaration,
supranote 1; Vitrano, supranote 33, at 455-56.
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administrative region whenever there is such a need.
The
Constitution contains no details regarding structure or legal
framework of the special administrative region. It has been

claimed by Chinese scholars that Article 31 is the constitutional
source for the legitimacy of the Hong Kong SAR, although this
35
article was initially aimed at reunification with Taiwan.
Obviously, such a flexible constitutional clause will give Hong
Kong little help in defending its system and lifestyle. Given future
constitutional disputes about the relationship between the Hong
Kong SAR and the central government, neither the Joint
Declaration nor the Constitution of the P.R.C. will benefit Hong
Kong in a significant way.
Even if a constitutional challenge would favor Hong Kong,
there Is no practical device in China to initiate a procedure of
constitutional review.
In China, the NPC and its Standing
Committee are defined as the highest national legislature.3 6 The
duties of the NPC Standing Committee include interpreting and
supervising the implementation of the Constitution. 3 7
All
disputes relating to the Constitutlon should theoretically be
presented to the NPC Standing Committee; however, neither the
Constitution itself nor the laws provide a transparent procedure
for constitutional review.
In most cases, the constitutional
disputes are solved by the Standing Committee on its own
initiative. No institutes or individuals are qualified under the
Constitution and other related laws to initiate a constitutional
review within the NPC and its Standing Committee, or within the
Hong Kong SAR government.3 8 Chinese law does not provide for
American-style judicial review. Therefore, taking a constitutional
dispute to court will be out of the question for the future Hong
Kong SAR government or people.
Similarly, the Basic Law will not strongly protect Hong Kong's
autonomy, although certain provisions in the law are specifically
aimed at limiting the authority of the central government over

35.

See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511, art. 11 [hereinafter
Basic Law]; see also XAO WEnUN, YIGUO LIANGZI YU XIANGGANG TEBIE
XINGZHENGQU JIBENFA ("ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS" AND THE BASIC LAW OF HONG
KONG SPEcIAL ADMimsTRATnvE REGION) 62 (1990); CHANGDAO & XIAOHANG, supra
note 9, at 63-66; WANG SHUWEN Er AL., XIANGGANG TEBIE XINGZHENGQU JIBENFA
DAOLUN (INTRODUcTON TO THE BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINIsTRATIVE

REGION) 63-70 (1990).
36.
XIANFA [Constitution] ch. 3, § 1. art. 57 (1982) (P.R.C.).
37.
XIANFA [Constitution] ch. 1, arts. 57, 62(1), & 67(1) (1982) (P.R.C.).
38.
The Basic Law does not permit Hong Kong to engage in Constitutional

disputes. Articles 158 and 159 empower the NPC Standing Committee to
interpret and amend the Basic Law. Consequently, disputes arising from the
Constitution and the Basic Law will be subject to the discretion of the NPC
Standing Committee. Basic Law, arts. 158, 159.
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Hong Kong SAR affairs. 39 The authority to interpret the Basic
Law rests with the NPC Standing Committee, which in the
exercise of such power is required to consult with a special
committee consisting of people from the mainland and Hong
Kong. It would be only futile to rely on such a law to protect the
Hong Kong SAR from abusive interference by the central
government.
B. PoliticalCrimes in the P.R.C.-EndangeringState Security and

Leaking State Secrets
Since the Hong Kong SAR will hardly remain free from the
influence of the central government, it is imperative to look at the
areas in which Hong Kong will be affected. There are at least
three major Chinese laws which will apply to Hong Kong and
could affect human rights protection there: the State Security
Law, the Law of Preservation of State Secrets, and the respective
provisions of the Criminal Law.40 Of these, the Criminal Law was
revised recently by the NPC. 4 1 These legal provisions-including
ones in the new criminal law-make crimes of many acts regarded
as lawful under internationally recognized human rights norms
and protected by laws in many other countries. Notable are the
crimes of "endangering state security," "subverting the
government," and "leaking state secrets." 4 2
In the previous
criminal
law,
these
were
roughly
referred
to
as
"counterrevolutionary crimes." 4 3
In the latest move of the
Chinese legislature, the term "counterrevolutionary crimes" has

39.

Article 158 of the Basic Law addresses the power of interpretation.

while Article 159 specifies the power of amendment. Both Articles are aimed at
limiting the arbitrariness of interpretations and changes in the law, by requiring
the central government to consult with the Hong Kong SAR government and with
Hong Kong's representatives to the National People's Congress before an
interpretation is handed out or an amendment is proposed. However, these
articles are limited in their application since the final authority of interpretation
and amendment rests with the central government. Id.
40.
The State Security Law was promulgated by the NPC Standing
Committee on February 22, 1993. The Implementation Regulations of the State
Security Law were signed into law by Premier IA Peng on June 4, 1994. The Law
of the P.R.C. on the guarding of State Secrets was passed by the NPC Standing
Committee, together with the Supplemental Provisions of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress Concerning Punishing the Crime of Leaking
State Secrets, on September 5, 1988.

On May 25, 1990, the Implementation

Rules on the Law of Preservation of State Secrets were issued by the State
Council.
41.
The NPC passed the amendments to the Criminal Law of the P.R.C. on
March 14, 1997, which will take effect on October 1, 1997.
42.
See Criminal Law, arts. 102-13 (P.R.C.).
43.

See Criminal Law, Part II, ch. 1, arts. 90-104 (1979) (P.R.C.).
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been replaced by the phrase "endangering state security" without
any other essential changes. 44
Under the above laws, Chinese political dissidents have
frequently been jailed under formal criminal charges or sent to
labor camps through the administrative system. 4 5 Wang Dan and
46
Wei Jingsheng are notable cases.
More remarkably, the State Security Law and its
Implementing rules have targeted foreign elements and political
dissidents. 4 7 According to the provisions of these two laws,
people who engage in activities aimed at "endangering state
security" will be severely punished. 4 8
"Endangering state
security" refers to acts committed by extraterritorial organizations
or individuals in order to subvert the government, split the
country, or overthrow the socialist system. 4 9 The same acts
committed by domestic individuals or organizations in collusion
with overseas organizations or individuals are also considered
"endangering state security."50 The primary targets of the State
Security Law are obviously people outside China. The laws
formally use the term "hostile" to distinguish extraterritorial
51
individuals and organizations that the government dislikes.

44.
See Human Rights in China and Human Rights Watch/Asia, Whose
Security? "StateSecurity" in China's New Criminal Code (1997) [hereinafter Whose
Security?.
45.
Re-education through labor (RTL) is an administrative measure by
which police authorities can deliver a maximum sentence of three-year
imprisonment with a possible one-year extension. One of the primary features of
RIL is that the sentence is handed out solely by the police without independent
judicial review. There is virtually no effective way to challenge the decision,
though the Administrative Litigation Law does allow a lawsuit to be brought
against the authority over this RTL decision.
46.
See Whose Security?, supra note 44. Wang Dan was convicted of the
charge of subversion and sentenced to 11 years imprisonment in 1996, while Wei
Jingsheng was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in 1995 for the crime of
subversion and secession. See Human Rights Watch/Asia, Slamming the Door on
Dissidents:Wang Dan's Trial (Nov. 1996); Human Rights in China, A Travesty of
Justice: the Show Trial of Wel Jngsheng (1996).
47.
See State Security Law, arts. 23-26 (1993) (P.R.C.); Implementation
Regulations of the State Security Law, arts. 6 & 7 (1994) (P.R.C.).
48.
According to the new Criminal Law, the death penalty can be imposed
for the crime of endangering state security". See Criminal Law, art. 113 (P.R.C.).
49.
State Security Law, art. 23 (1993) (P.R.C.).
50.
Id.
51.
Article 5 of the Implementation Regulations of the State Security Law
reads as follows:
"[Hjostile" organizations, mentioned in the State Security Law, refer to the
organizations being hostile against the People's Democratic Dictatorship
and Socialism system of the People's Republic of China, and endangering
state security. Which organization is deemed to be a "hostile" organization
is decided by either the Ministry of State Security or the Ministry of Public
Security.
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Who or which organizations should be deemed "hostile" to China
will be subject to the absolute discretion of the Ministries of
Public Security and State Security.5 2 Human rights groups are
likely to be identified as "groups with hostility against China." On
at least one occasion, Human Rights in China (hereinafter HRIC)
was labeled as "a group with hostility against China," simply
because it had publicized a report about human rights abuses in
China. Other dissident organizations always appear on the top of
the list of "hostile organizations" under the State Security Law
and its Implementing Rules. In several instances, China has tried
to use this law to detain and punish people who have connections

with overseas organizations and individuals, especially with
overseas dissidents. Some overseas dissidents have been denied
entry into China for this reason.5 3 For instance, under these
laws, Bei Dao, an exiled poet, was denied entry into China in
1994. 54

Another international human rights expert was sent

back when he tried to enter China to attend an international anticorruption conference in Beijing.5 5 Moreover, it was widely
reported that the border authorities had been required to stop
6
people on a blacklist produced by the Ministry of State Security.
After Deng Xiaoping's death, an internal circular demanded that
people whose names were on a list newly released by the Ministry
of Public Security should be stopped and repatriated at the
borders. 57 Hang Xiaorong, wife of the Chairman of the HRIC, was
prevented from entering China at the border of Hong Kong and
58
China.
Another Chinese law affecting similar rights is the Law of
Preservation of State Secrets,5 9 promulgated in 1988. This law
prohibits many acts recognized by internationally accepted

Implementation Regulations of the State Security Law, art. 5 (1994) (P.R.C.)

(translated by the author).
52.
Id.
53.
See Human Rights in China and Human Rights Watch/Asia, Enforced
Exile of Dissidents,Government "Re-entry Blacklist"Revealed (Jan. 1995).
54.
Bei Dao is a prominent poet exiled after the 1989 student movement.
He was denied entry to China at Beijing Airport for refusing to produce a list of

members of Human Rights in China, of which he is a board member. See HONG
KONG LIEN Ho PAO, Nov. 27, 1994, at 8.

55.
Mr. Nick Howen, the director of the London-based Amnesty
International legal office, was denied entry and put on a BA flight back to London,
when he tried to attend a conference in Beijing. See Hong Kong AFP (visited

October 5, 1997) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov.>.
56.
See Enforced Exile of Dissidents, Government "Re-entry Blacklist"
Revealed, supranote 53.
57.
See China-To Safeguard Stability, Pro-DemocracyActivists Banned from

Entry,Hong Kong Sing Tao JihPao,Feb. 25, 1997 atA4.
58.
59.

Interview with Liu Qing, Chairman of Human Rights in China.
Law of Preservation of State Secrets (1988) (P.R.C.).
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human rights standards as exercise of free speech. 60
The law
uses sweeping language like "other items the authorities consider
state secrets" to define "state secrets," so that people are unable
to decide to what the term "state secrets" exactly refers.6 1 In
addition, the authorities are given broad discretion to define
"state secrets" without any judicial review or other legal method
for contesting their decision. Among the state secrets enumerated
in the law and related legal documents, some items categorized as
state secrets are regarded as common knowledge in many other
countries, such as data and crime and education. 62 Because of
ambiguous definitions and arbitrary determinations .of what

constitutes state secrets, some journalists have been charged and

63
punished under these laws for normal coverage activities.
Among them, Xi Yang, a Hong Kong-based journalist, received a
twelve-year prison term in 1992 for stealing state secrets. He was
released on parole in 1997 before the Chinese new year, obviously
to ease anxiety of the Hong Kong people about the upcoming
transfer of power.
China's recent revision of its eighteen-year-old criminal law
does little to improve the whole system. The only visible change
was that the term "counterrevolutionary" was been dropped and
replaced with that of "endangering state security."6 4 Arguably,
the revision harms rather than helps, since the scope of
"endangering state security" crimes has been greatly expanded to
apply to any domestic individual whether or not the person has
65
foreign ties.
After Hong Kong is returned to China, the legal provisions
discussed above could adversely affect Hong Kong in the following
ways. First, because the legal regime is aimed to target "foreign
elements" and Hong Kong is legally defined as a non-China
area,6 6 people and organizations in Hong Kong can be
incriminated under these laws if they engage in or aid domestic
people in any activities of "subverting the government of PRC."
One significant change after the handover is that the people of
Hong Kong are now citizens of the P.R.C. The foreign shelter

60.
See Human Rights in China and Human Rights Watch/Asia, Leaking
State Security: The Case of Gao Yu (July 1995).

61.

See Law of Preservation of State Security, art. 8 (1988) (P.R.C.).

62.
63.

See Whose Security?, supranote 44.
Other cases like Gao Yu's show that a joumallst's normal news

coverage would risk leaking state secrets. See Leaking State Security: The Case of
Gao Yu, supra note 60.

64.

See Whose Security?, supranote 44.

65.
Id. See also Criminal Law, arts. 100-13 (1997) (P.R.C.).
66.
Hong Kong and Taiwan are considered "extraterritorles," which means
the area not directly under the rule of the P.R.C. According to China, people of
these areas will be regarded as the people outside China.
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provided by the British colonial government is gone.
The
likelihood of Hong Kong residents being prosecuted under the
State Security Law is substantially increased. Moreover, it is
possible that there will be an agreement between the Hong Kong
SAR government and the Chinese central government with regard
to judicial assistance. Under such an arrangement, it will be
eminently likely that the government of China will exercise its
jurisdiction over Hong Kong residents commenting on Chinese
affairs, as Hong Kong residents did in 1989.67 The state security

law regime will no longer be an intimidation device; instead, it will
become a real threat for the people in Hong Kong. Chinese
leaders have declared in many settings that China will not allow
Hong Kong to be a base against China. 6 8 Applying the state
security law will be the strongest means for preventing such
incursion.
Second, the state security laws can be used as a guide in
enacting sedition laws in Hong Kong itself. According to the Basic
Law of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong SAR government should, at a
proper time, enact on its own, a law regarding sedition or
treason. 6 9 There was a set of rules in the British legal system
concerning sedition and treason. Although the sedition and
treason laws have been idle for four decades, 70 theoretically any
act which tends to incitement could be treated as sedition or
treason in Hong Kong. To narrow the scope of such serious
charges, the LegCo considered an amendment in 1996;71

67.

In 1989, millions of Hong Kong people marched in the street to show

their support for the student's movement throughout the country. Huge amounts

of money were amassed for aiding the student leader escaping from the

crackdown.
68.

See Lu Jing, Nine Nos to Hong Kong after 1997, CHENG MING, Nov.

1996, at 20-21. In this report, it was said that Qian Qicheng, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, had confirmed, in an internal conference concerning Hong Kong's
handover, that the central government had issued a "nine no's" policy regarding
post-handover Hong Kong. Among those nine no's, there was a ban on
international hostile organizations in Hong Kong, a ban on some local political
groups from engaging n anti-communist activities, and a prohibition on the
media from attacking or distorting the central leaders, the central government,
the socialist system or communist policies.
69.
Article 23 states: "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition,
subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to
prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political
activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the
Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies." Basic
Law, art. 23.
70.
In Hong Kong, the last prosecution for sedition was in 1953 and for
treason in 1946. See Territory Survived Well WLthout Need for Rules, S. CHNA
MORNING PosT, Nov. 27, 1996, at 4.
71.
See HONG KONG STANDARD, Apr. 2, 1997, at 5.
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however, any part of the existing laws associated with colonialism
will be eliminated after the handover. The concept of sedition in
the British system is obviously one of the laws to be abolished.
Therefore, the future legislature of Hong Kong SAR will need to
work out a new concept of sedition or treason. The concept
enshrined in the state security law could be a guide for future
legislation on this issue. China would surely like to see a similar
definition accepted by Hong Kong, which could serve as a
convenient weapon to keep Hong Kong under China's sway.
Although many suggest that the new law regarding sedition
should be in accord with international human rights norms,
notably ICCPR, some indications show that expecting full
compliance with the ICCPR without any Chinese flavor will be
72
naive.
C. Hong Kong and InternationalHuman Rights Law

As discussed earlier, it is unrealistic to hope for international
recourse based upon the Joint Declaration in the event of China's
violating its promises on Hong Kong; however, there are some
optimistic scenarios regarding Hong Kong's pursuit of its
responsibilities under international human rights covenants.
Hong Kong is a party to the two major international human
rights covenants by virtue of the U.K.'s ratification of these two
covenants. 73 Since the U.K. certified the covenants, the British
government has submitted periodic reports on their
implementation in Hong Kong on Hong Kong's behalf. 74 During

the negotiation between the U.K. and China, the status of Hong
Kong under these international treaties became a major issue for
both sides. The Joint Declaration generated an ambiguous
solution: "the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
And Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain
72.

Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief executive of Hong Kong SAR, vowed to

roll back the social ordinances which were amended by the current Hong Kong

government. He also issued an instruction to the police authority with regard to

the concept of "state security" after he took office, which caused outcries from the

legal community and the general public. See Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, supra

note 5.
73.
Britain ratified the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights
(hereinafter ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social And
Economic Rights (hereinafter ICESER) in 1976 and assumed the responsibilities

under these two covenants for her colonies. Hong Kong was among these
colonies.
74.
On behalf of Hong Kong, the U.K. has submitted a total of four periodic
reports on the implementation of ICCPR to the Human Rights Committee
(hereinafter HRC), along with several supplementary reports at the request of the
members of the HRC since 1976.
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in force."75 Few specifics were given about how to comply with, or
who should be responsible for, the reporting obligations described
by the covenants. According to the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law of Hong Kong, China will be responsible for all foreign
affairs and defense, while the Hong Kong SAR will handle the
others. 76 If reporting to the human rights committee and the
committee on economic, social and cultural rights is categorized
as "foreign affairs," then the obligation will fall to the central
government; however, given that the reporting duty is considered
a local matter, the Hong Kong SAR government will be
responsible for dealing with the covenant's bodies.
The status of Hong Kong under the ICCPR was simplified by
the HRC. In its 1453th meeting on October 20, 1995, the HRC
explained the situation of Hong Kong after the handover under
the covenants. Its conclusion was:
Once the people living in a territory find themselves under the
protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, such protection cannot be denied to them by virtue of the

mere dismemberment of that territory or its coming within the

jurisdiction of another State or of more than one State.7 7

After considering the Sino-Britain Joint Declaration concerning
Hong Kong, the HRC continued: "[als the reporting requirements
under article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights will continue to apply, the Human Rights
Committee considers that it is competent to receive and review
78
reports that must be submitted in relation to Hong Kong."
Although the conclusion of the HRC did not state who should be
responsible for reporting obligations, the most possible obligor will
be either the government of China or the government of Hong
Kong SAR. It has been speculated that the government of China
would be embarrassed to report only the human rights situation
of Hong Kong but not the overall situation of China, because
China is not a party to the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Recently,
however, China surprisingly declared that she would report to the
HRC on behalf of Hong Kong in 79
post-1997, though China
obviously did so with great reluctance.
To accommodate the requirements of the two covenants, the
Hong Kong government enacted the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in

75.
76.
77.
78.

See Joint Declaration, supranote 1, Annex I, para. XIII, at 1375.
Id. See also Basic Law, arts. 13-14.
See UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.57, supra note 24.
Id.

79.
It was reported that China took an inflexible stance on this issue in the
past. According to Dr. Jayawickrama, the Chairman of Justice, "it was a pleasant
surprise." See HONG KONG STANDARD, July 5, 1997, at 3.
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1991,80 which was fiercely attacked by China. 8 1 The legal
supremacy over other ordinances claimed by China contradicts
the legal foundation of, and therefore violates, the Joint
Declaration. The real intention of the central government might
not be to put Hong Kong under its tight control, but rather to
hold Hong Kong in an early check in order to keep things in
control. Likewise, China has exerted pressure on other matters in
Hong Kong, and the media has been forced to conduct selfcensorship.8 2 A report revealed that self-censorship had been in
practice for a long time while the handover was approaching,
partially because of fears about surviving the handover and
partially due to the intimidation of the Chinese government. 8 3
The spokesmen of China in many public settings have tried to
categorize media freedom in a narrow way, which has certainly
caused a great panic among major media, especially those with
political or economic connections to China. On one occasion, Lu
Ping, one of the chief policy-making officers of the P.R.C. on Hong
Kong affairs, made a distinction between news reports and
editorials with respect to certain sensitive topics like Tibet or
Taiwan's independence. The former will be allowed while the
latter will be prohibited, according to Lu. 8 4 No details were given
on what standards will be applied in making such a
differentiation.

Actually, the ICCPR provides a set of standards on human
rights, including that of freedom of speech. 85 Will the Hong Kong
SAR follow the standards set out in the ICCPR and other
internationally-recognized human rights instruments in dealing
with freedom of speech? This will remain a tough question for the
future government of the Hong Kong SAR. Apparently, China
expects the first chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR to keep
Hong Kong's media off the subject of mainland affairs, and is

80.
According to China's explanation, the Bill of Rights Ordinance violated
the Basic Law because it can override other legislation. See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Mar.
20, 1997 at 2; Commentary Views 'Purpose'of Bill of Rights, HONG KONG WEN WEI
PO,Jan. 2, 1995, at All.
81.
See Safeguarding Sino-British Joint Declaration,BEIJING REVIEW (visited
March, 1997) <http://www.chinanews.org/bjreview/97Mar/97-9-3.html>.

82.
Self-censorship has long been conducted even before the handover.
See Keller, supra note 15, at 377-82. It has been widely reported that the selfcensorship deteriorated when some Hong Kong media, especially those listed in
the market, tilted their stance pro-China or stayed away from conflicts with
China, either for economic or political reasons. See also HONG KONG HsIN PAO
(Hong Kong Economic Journal), available at U.S. government service FBIS-CHI97-081, Apr. 23, 1997, at 22.
83.
See Fong So, Free Press: Contributing to Hong Kong's Success or A
DisruptiveFactor?,CHINARIGHTS FORUM, Winter 1996 at 8-11.
84.
SeeWENWEI Po, June 6, 1996 at B5.
See ICCPR, supranote 6, art. 19.
85.
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particularly concerned that media in Hong Kong not use freedom
of speech to "undermine" the integrity of the motherland.8 6 The
government of the Hong Kong SAR will find it challenging to strike
a balance between protecting human rights of the Hong Kong
people and satisfying the demands of Beijing.
If the above situation gets out of hand and the central
government interferes either directly or indirectly with the
liberties of Hong Kong people, will the international community be
able to compel China to abide by the provisions of the ICCPR or
other human rights instruments to which Hong Kong is a party?.
The answer is no, in many senses. First of all, the UN human
rights mechanism is fairly weak in its enforcement. According to
the ICCPR, the implementation of the Covenant mostly relies on

the self-compliance of the state parties concerned. The HRC is
only a supervising and coordinating organ responsible for
communicating information and receiving and reviewing the
country reports, as well as hosting the annual meetings. The
members of the Covenant have created no mechanism to
effectively enforce the provisions of the Covenant. Moreover,
China is not a party to the ICCPR, although it will likely ratify the
Covenant in the near future. Whether to comply with the
Covenant is more or less optional for China, while reporting the
human rights situation in Hong Kong will almost certainly be a
procedural gesture rather than a substantive obligation. In
addition, China is a permanent member of the Security Council of
the United Nations. To compel China to adhere to the Covenant
through the U.N. system will absolutely be one of the toughest
87
missions of this international organization.
IV. HONG KONG'S

REINTEGRATION INro CHINA

As discussed above, the possibilities for keeping China to its
word through either domestic constitutional challenge or through
such international channels as the U.N. system seem relatively
remote. For this reason, the future of Hong Kong is unlikely to be
permeated with permissiveness. It would be perceptive to look at
both sides of the integration of Hong Kong into China.

86.
In most cases, the government's warning that Hong Kong should not
be allowed to be a base against China refers to media coverage. See Basic Law,
art. 23. See also supratext accompanying note 69.
87.
See Vitrano, supranote 33, at 459-60.
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A. PossibleImpact of the Chinese Legal System on the Traditional
Role of Hong Kong
The role of China in Hong Kong after the handover has been
a focus of the human rights community.
To appropriately
understand this circumstance, it would be helpful to look at a
bigger picture of the traditional role of Hong Kong in China's
affairs.
Hong Kong has been a free forum for China observers and a
free information transfer center for a long time. Since the 1989
Tiananmen Massacre, Hong Kong itself has become a serious
critic of China in many aspects, which has greatly affected people
inside China. Meanwhile, Hong Kong is a friendly host for many
Chinese dissidents and a hot bed for free speech, which enables
Chinese people to enjoy free information about China. Many call
this situation "exported information being imported back." Some

Hong Kong publications have been heavily circulated among
mainland Chinese intellectuals, officials, and the general public.
The popularity of these Hong Kong magazines in China could be
seen in the fact that China put them on the top of prohibited lists
of overseas publications. Importing them Is made a crime and
punishable.
To some extent, Chinese people exercise their
freedom of speech through Hong Kong publications.
Most
information publicized in Hong Kong is furnished or written by
people inside China, and many of the readers are Chinese.
Moreover, Hong Kong serves as a model for Chinese people
who live under a totalitarian system. It has played a significant
role in the transformation of the lives of ordinary Chinese.
Popular music, fashion, and most modem art are introduced into
China via Hong Kong. More significant is that some modem
social thought has been adopted by China as a result of the Hong
Kong experience. The system of civil servants is prominent. The
recent political reform in Hong Kong also provides China with an
experiment in democracy, which has significantly stunned the
leadership.
With the aforesaid picture in mind, it will be much easier to
understand that Hong Kong could be materially affected by China
for the short-term after the handover.
First, there is a likelihood that China will require Hong Kong
to curb freedom of speech 88 and perhaps freedom of association

88.
Qian Qichen, Vice-Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
was interviewed by the Asian Wall Street Journal in October 1996, and he
asserted that in the future, "Hong Kong should not hold those political activities
which directly interfere in the affairs of the mainland." See Fong, supranote 83.
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as they relate to Chinese affairs. 8 9 According to Article 23 of the
Basic Law of Hong Kong, Hong Kong shall enact laws on its own
to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central Government, or theft of state secrets. 9 0 The
law also requires the Hong Kong government to prohibit foreign
political organizations or bodies from conducting political
activities in the region, and to prohibit political organizations or
bodies in the region from establishing ties with foreign political
organizations or bodies. 9 1 This article expressly indicates that
China is not going to tolerate any individuals or organizations
that seriously challenge the authority of the central government.
China will not, as Chinese leaders have said on several occasions,
allow Hong Kong to become a base used by an "international
hostile force" against China. 92 Although the Basic Law requests
that Hong Kong legislate on this matter on its own, China can still
influence the content of such legislation. In addition, the NPC
Standing Committee formally retains the power to interpret the
Basic Law. 9 3 Through exercising its power of interpretation, the
Standing Committee will be able to add whatever it wants. In
addition, the power of amendment of the Basic Law is vested in
the Standing Committee. 9 4 Whenever it needs, the NPC Standing
Committee can modify the Basic Law.
There are many indications that Hong Kong has already
exercised self-restraint in exercising freedom of speech. Some
newspapers are beginning to cut back articles on sensitive topics

about China. It was reported that a prominent local newspaper
had fired its cartoon author, who had caricaturized many Chinese
leaders. 9 5 Some professors have complained about academic
freedom.
One professor said that he could not get enough
funding from the administration of his university for a conference
on the international status of Tibet, because his supervisor
96
worried about the reaction of the Chinese government.

89.
at 22.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Basic Law, art. 23. See also HONG KONG HsIN PAO, supra note 82,
Basic Law, art. 23.
Id.
Id. See also supratext accompanying note 69.
Basic Law, art. 158.
Id. art. 159.

95.
It was reported that Mr. Larry Feign, a cartoonist for the S. China
Morning Post, was fired after he had spent eight years with the newspaper. See
Sacking of CartoonistFeeds CensorshipFears,Hong Kong AFP in English, May 22,
1995.
96.
Interview with Professor at University of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong

(Aug. 1996). The professor granted this interview on the condition of anonymity.
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Another obvious fear before reunification was for the fate of
dissidents in Hong Kong after June 30, 1997. 9 7 There were about
eighty dissidents in Hong Kong. China's policy towards the Hong
Kong SAR has caused serious concerns for them. An international
rescue plan was being developed to find a third country to receive
the dissidents before the changeover. 9 8
One potential circumstance will affect foreign organizations in
Hong Kong. According to Article 23 of the Basic Law, China may
request the government of Hong Kong to expel some politically
sensitive organizations. 9 9 As some might know, a number of nongovernmental-organizations (hereinafter NGOs) have branches in
Hong Kong.
These NGOs include prominent human rights
groups, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
HRIC also has a branch office. What happens to these human
rights groups will be a good test of the patience and tolerance of
the Chinese government.
B. Hong Kong's Influence on China
Integration is always a two-way endeavor. While Hong Kong
will surely be integrated into China with the passage of time, just
as its economy has been substantially integrated with that the

mainland, China will be equally influenced by Hong Kong in many
ways. Aside from its strong economic influence on China, Hong
Kong could play a major role in the course of China's
modernization.
First, Hong Kong will serve as a model for China in many
respects. Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of social stability and
economic prosperity.
For many Hong Kong watchers, its
successes are primarily attributed to its system: a highly effective
civil servant system and the rule of law, plus the recent
development of democracy.' 0 0
Many Chinese agree with this
view, although Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed that the
key to Hong Kong's prosperity is the consistent support of
mainland China and the diligence of the Hong Kong people.' 0 '
Chinese scholars often praise Hong Kong for its corruption-free
government and urge the government to learn lessons from Hong
97.

See Hong Kong: UK Reported Seeking Homes in West for PRC Dissidents,

S. CmNA MORNING POST. July 23, 1996 at 6.

98.

Id.

99.

See Basic Law, art. 23.

100. See Keller, supranote 15.
101. Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the CCP and president of the
People'§ Republic of China said. in an interview with the French Newspaper Le
Figaro, that Hong Kong's prosperity was mainly attributed to the creativity of
Hong Kong people, as well as to the support of the mainland and its open policy.
See Fong, supra note 83.
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Kong. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the civil servant system of
Hong Kong provides an example to China on how to reform its
bureaucratic system. Furthermore, the recent democratic reform
proves that democracy can be realized in a traditional Chinese
area (although Hong Kong may not be considered a purely
traditional Chinese society). There have been some indications

that Chinese leaders might take this very seriously.

Not

coincidentally, current basic level elections have been held
throughout China, although the overall electoral system has not
02
significantly changed.1
Second, with regard to the protection of human rights, there
are several possible influences that Hong Kong might exert on
China. Based upon the provisions of the Basic Law, Hong Kong
will enjoy a considerably high degree of autonomy, and most of its
residents' human rights will be enshrined in international human
rights instruments, primarily the ICCPR and ICESCR. These
rights are guaranteed by the black letter law incorporated in the
Basic Law and other legislation. Thus, after Hong Kong returns
to China, one serious question will remain: why should mainland
Chinese not enjoy the same rights as Hong Kong residents do?
There must be a plausible answer and the Chinese government
will have to wrestle with itself in trying to answer it.
A third and important influence of Hong Kong over China is
that China will face a challenge from the international community
in terms of two international human rights covenants, the ICCPR
and ICESCR, regardless of whether China takes them seriously.
As discussed earlier, despite the fact that China is not a party to
the two covenants, after the handover, Hong Kong will remain a
party. As requested by the covenants, Hong Kong will submit to
the HRC periodic reports about its implementation of the
covenants. China will be under tremendous pressure to ratify

these two covenants.10 3 Even if it does not ratify them, China will

still need to report to the HRC about Hong Kong's implementation
of the covenants,1 0 4 which will definitely embarrass China a great
deal. Recently, it has been reported that China may ratify the two

102.

See Chinow CNN Interviews Jiang Zemin in Beging, XnIUA DOMESTIC

SERV., May 9. 1997. For details on the local election, see Chna: Direct Election,
RuralDemocracy Viewed, XINHUA DOMESTIC SERv., May 9, 1997.
103. Jiang Zeming, president of the P.R.C., announced to the visiting

defense minister of France that China would ratify the International Covenant on
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights by the end of 1997.
Apr. 2, 1997, at 1.
104. See supra notes 73-74.

See PEopiEs DAILY,
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covenants. 10 5 This could partially be attributed to the status of
Hong Kong as a party to the covenants.

Fourth, Hong Kong will influence China's legal system.
China's economic legislation largely mirrors that of Hong Kong

and other countries, and China will continue to learn from Hong
Kong in the development of its market system. 10 6 As its economic
reform progresses, China will inevitably encounter political
problems. As many expect, political reform in China will occur
sooner or later. This is necessary to pave the way for China's
economic growth. Accordingly, Hong Kong will play an active role
I0 7
in China's political reform.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that, with the change of power, human
rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong will be in peril. Despite the
fact that China needs Hong Kong for its economic development,
and that maintaining Hong Kong's status quo Is in the best
interest of China, China will be unlikely to tolerate any challenge
from Hong Kong in terms of their interrelationship. Therefore,
human rights may be sacrificed. The Hong Kong SAR government
will need to strike a balance between the demands of China and
the interests of the Hong Kong people. If China does not abide by
its promises to Hong Kong, Hong Kong will have few international
or domestic remedies. To keep China to its word, the issue of
Hong Kong must remain an international concern. Even if the
international community does keep appropriate pressure on
China, however, there are no guarantees about the future of Hong
Kong.
There will be two significant processes after the handover:
Hong Kong's reintegration into China and China's reintegration
into the world. These two processes are equally important and
will affect each other. In the short term, Hong Kong is very likely

to be adversely affected by China in terms of its legal system and
human rights. There may be some setbacks in the protection of
human rights. Nevertheless, Hong Kong could, together with
other democratic countries, turn China into a more humane and
democratic country by making full use of its unique position.

105. See HongKong: UK Reported Seeking Homes n Westfor PRC Dissidents,
supranote 97.
106. See Daniel R. Fung, Foundationfor the Survival of the Rule of Law in
Hong Kong-the Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 283 (1996-97). See also Li Changdao, StrengtheningLegal Links Between the
MainlandAnd Hong Kong, PEOPLE'S DAILY (overseas ed.), Apr. 18, 1996, at 5.
107. Id.
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With the passing of Deng Xiaoping, China is at a historical
crossroads. How to integrate China into the world becomes a
challenging task for the rest of the world. Clearly, Hong Kong will
play a significant role in this transition. The longer the model of
"one country, two systems" in Hong Kong survives, the safer
Hong
Kong and the world will be.

